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Abstract. This paper considers a special class of cost allocation problems, where the
communication possibilities among the agents are restricted. Integral formulas are de-
ri~-ed for two allocation rules: the Myerson value and the position value.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a group of economic agents who a11 want to make use of some machines
or facilities. If the agents cooperate they can possibly share some fa,cilities and thus
save costs. In section 2 it is shown that this kind of cost allocation problems give rise
to concave cost garnes which lic in the cone generated by all dual unanimity games.
Subsequently, we investigate the consequences of a restriction in rommunication
possibilities between the agents on this kind of cost allocation problems. Throughout
tliis paper we assume that the communication possibilities can be modelled by means
of a(communication) graph. Based on the Shapley value, two solution concepts for
conrmunication situations were introduced: the :~~Zyerson value and the position value.
An axiomatic characterization of the 1`lyerson value was given by Myerson (19ï7) and
Bor-rrc et al. (1990) gave an axiomatic characterization of the position value in case of
cycle-free communication graphs. Van den Nouweland and Borm (1990) proved that
if a communication graph is cycle-complete (cycle-free) and the underlying cost game
is concave, then the Myerson value (position value) is in the core of the corresponding
graph-restricted game.
Owen (1986) and Borm, et al. (1990) provided integral forrrrulas to compute the
~Iyerson value and the position value in situations where the communication graph is
cycle-free and the underlying game is a quadratic measure game. In section 3 we derive
integral fornrulas for the Myerson value aud the position value in situations where the
iuiderlying cost game is a dua.l tmanimity game.
2. THE MODEL
Let N:- {1,...,ii} and 2N :- {S ~ S C N}. By TUN we denote the class
of a.ll transferable ut,ility ga~nes (N,v) with player set 1V and charactert9ttc function
c, : 3'~`~ ~~ with r( 0)- 0. There are basically two ways to interpret a TL'-game
(.~-, r), the a.mount c~(S) can represent the revenue~gains for a coalition S C.N or it can
rcpresent the costs for this coalition. We prefer to denote a TU-game by (N,c) if it is
to be interpreted as a cost game.
In this paper we consider cost games that are generated by cost allocation problems
c~f t1iP forrn (N, F, p. d). Here. N is the set of players, F is a finite set of facilities.
p: F~ ff8f is a function t.hat assigns to every facility its non-negative price, and
d:,1' --~ 2F is a function that assigns to every player the subset of facilities demanded
L~~ this player.
Let (1V, F, p, d) be such a cost allocation problem. Then the players in a coalition S C N
have to purchase each facility that at least one of them demands. On the other hand,
.~
if two (or rnorc~) playen demand the same facility, then they only have to purchase it
once. Hence, this allocation problem leads to a cost game (N, c) with
c(s) :- ~P(r) Iivr(S),
r E F'
~~-here, for all r E F, Nr :- {~i E N ~ r E d(i)} is the set of players who demanci facilit}'
r, and ec` is the rlual unanimit a~ne on N, defined by u`. S ~ 1 if S(1 Nr ~ 0;v, .~l 9 r ,ti~ ( ~ - 0 else
The proof of theorem 1 is straightforward and therefore omitted.
THEOREM r. The clas, of a.ll eost games corresponding to cost allocation prohlems of
the fornl (N, F,~, d) is the convex cone generated by all dl-ial unanimit,y games uM with
.ll E 2N`{0}.
A cost game (N, c) is called con.cave if it is more advantageous to join a larger coalition
UI', lIl fUIIIlllla, lf
c(S U {i}) - c(S) j c(T U {i}) - c(T)
for all r E N and all S C T C N~{i}. The class of concave games with player set
.V is a convex cone a.nd (~~~, le L1) is a concave game for every AI C N. Therefore, a
dirc~ct collsequc?ncc of t.llc~orem 1 is that all cost games corresponding to cost allocation
prol~lelns of the form (N, F, p, d~ are concave.
It may he notecl that the Shapley valwe ~(N,c) E IféN (cf. Slzapley (1953)) of the
cost game (N, c) corresponding to the cost allocation problem (N, F, p, d~ has a nice
illt~~rprc~t~ltiou. As i, e~asily scen tlle Shaplc~y value of a clllal unanirnity ganle (N,7cht)
c~c)nr~l~ 0 for i~ AI ~11IC1 ~t~ for i E RI. Sinccr t.hc~ Sllapley value is linea.r, it fiillows thnt.
`I'~( ~~, c) -
for all i E.V, which implies that the costs of each facility are equally dicided arllong the
pla~'c~rs tllat Inake nse of it.
3. INTEGRAL FORMULAS FOR THE MYERSON VALUE AND THE
POSITION VALUE
So far. we implicitl}~ assumed that all players can freely communicate with one
anotller. Now suppose that communication between the players is restricted and that
thc~ colnmunication possihilities are determined b~- an undirected (comm,unication) graph
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(N,.-1) in which the points are the players and the ares correspond to pairs of players
who can communicate directly. A triple ( N, c, A), where (N, c) is a cost game and (N, A)
is a communication graph, is called a com.raunication situation.
Let ( N, c, .4) be a communication situation. Then the players in a coalition S C N can
effect communication through all communication links of
.~1(S) :- {{i, j} E A ~{i, j} C S}.
Hence a coalition S splits up into (comrnunicatio~a) cornporaents in the following way:
T C S is a component within S if and only if the graph (T, .9(T ) ~ is connected and there
is no set T such that TCT C S and (T, A(T)~ is connected. We denote the resulting
partition of S by S~A.
Taking into account these~ communicat.ion restrictions, the costs cA(S) for a coalition
S E 2N can be defined as
Cq(.S) :- ~ C(T).
TES~A
(1~', c,~ ) is called the graph-restricted game.
One can also focus on the communication links. The cost savings for the grand coalition
incluced by the presencP of the communication links in L C A are defined as
rjv(L) :- ~ c({i}) - ~ c(T).
iEIV TEN~L
( A, rv) is called the arc (cost savings) ga-nze.
1'ow we are reacíy to formulate the definitions of the Myerson value and the position
value.
The Myerson ualue Ei(N,c,A) E ~N (cf. Myerson (197ï)) is defined as the Shapley
~.alue of thc~ corresponding graph-restricted ganie, i.e.
~[( N, C, .4) :- ~( N, Cq).
Tlie positiorz naliie of a cornmunication situation (cf. Bor~rt et al. (1990)) is based upon
the Shapley vahie of the corresponding arc game: the corresponding cost savings of
each arc are equa.ll,y dividccí among the players it connects. With the aid of these cost




for all i E a~. is called the position value of the cornmunication situation (.~, c, rl ). Here,
.-li :- {{i, j} E rl ~ j E:ti'} is the set of all communication links of which player i is an
end point.
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I3oth t.he i`1~'erson value and the positiou value are linear with respect to the underlying
cost game. Therefore, in deriving integral forrnulas for both values we can restrict our
attention to ciual unanimitg- games. because all cost games we con5ider are positive
combinations of dual unanimity games ( cf. theorem 1).
First we derive an integral formula for the Myerson value of a communication situation
(1~', caM, A), 1lI C N, if the communication graph (N, A) is a tree.
Let (:~', c, ~) be a communication situation. As is well known, the game (N, cA) can be
written ati
cA - ~ O~A~S) us,
SE2~"`{0}




a.ncl the dividends v~a ( S) ( cf. Harsanyi ( 1959 )) are given by
T~~ S
-1)ISI-ITI cA~T)
for a11 S E 2-~~`{0}.
In t.he following we consicier a fixc~d communication situation (N, ii;y, A) where ~N~ ~ 2
Flll(1 ~ .ti., .~ ~ 15 a tI'E'e.
In this case the dividends Ot,,.~~)~(S) are given by (cf. Owen (1986))
(~-1)~snni~tr if ~S, A(S)~ is connected and Ext~S, A(S)~ - S fl M
~t~:`r)"~S) - (l0 else
for all S E 2~~{~}. Here, for a connected graph ~5,.4(S)~
E~ct(S, d(S)) :- {i E S ~ ~A; ~ A(S)~ C 1}
clenutes the set of r.xtrem,e points.
Consequently.





for .cll i E 1~-, wherc~
~(.-l) :- {S C:~' ~( S,.-1(S)~ is connected and Ext~S,A(S)~ - Sfl ilI}.
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In order to apply (1) we havc to find all e~lements in ~(:~) cont~aining a player i. This
r:ut l,c dutti~ in tL~~ fcillowin~; way.
For e~.ery S C C ~~'ith C E.ti'~.~, we can define the connected hull of S( cf. Owen (1986))
bv
H(S) :- ~{T ~ S C T C C, (T, A(T)) is a connected graph}.
Let i E N and let. A, : -{{z~,i(1)},..., {i,i(t)}}. Clearly, since (N,A) does not contain
a cycle, the partition .V~(.~1~A; ) contains t distinct components C(1), ..., C(t) with
i(1: ) E C( k) for all k E { 1. . .., t}. For each ~- E{ 1, . .., t} we define a connected
subgraph (T(k),A(T(~)~~ of (C(~),A(C(k)~~ bY
T(k) :- ~ {H({i(k),1}) I IH({á(h), j}) n M~ - i}. (2)
ÍEM1fnC(k)
So, in particular, T(k) - 0 if C(k) f111~I -~, T(k) -{i(k)} if i(k) E ï11 and in all other
cases Ext(T('h~), A(T(k~)))~{i(k)} - T(k) n 111.
Iu dericing a generating function (cf. Owen (1972)) for the Myerson value we suppose
that each pla.yer has a probability :z' t.o be 'active' ~r 'operational' and we compute for
eacl~t subgraph ~T(k),.~(T(k)}~ the probability Pk(a) that at least one of the players
in aI fl T(k) can act.ually- iuteract wit.h player i. Using the inclusion-exclusion principle
this probability Pk(x) is given by
SC('T(k)na1),5~8
(-1)~s~tt~,~fi~su{~(k)})I (3)
for a11 k E{ 1, ..., t}. Note that Pk(~) - 0 if T(l~) f1111 - 0. The expected costs player ~i
generates by linking up the components C(1), ..., C(t) are described by the generating
fitnction d;(r), whcre
i
1 - ~k-~ Pk.(,T)
A;(.t') :- r ,
~,-z~r~c{i,...,r},~i~~-r(-1) ~kEiti ~k(~T)
In particular we have that B;(.r) - 0 if i ~ M and t- 1.
`cn~~ we can formnlatc
ifiE161
if i ~ ?f1.
THEOREM 2. Let (1~,.-i) be a tree wlth I~'~ ~ 2. Then for all M E 2N`{0},
{ta(.~', ti tir, A) - ~ B;(.r.)dz (5)
0
for all i E 1~'. where B,(.r) is tlefittcd as in (4).
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k-t sc(T(k)nnf).s~0 ~H(S U{i(k)})~ -~ 1~
~1ote that, since i E 11I, for each k E{ 1, ..., t} a coalition S C T(k) f1 1L~1 with S~ 0




i-~ ~ ~-~~s~ ~ ~~~
where ~k(A) :- {S E~(A) ~ S C(T(l~) U{i})} for all k E {1,... ,t}.
The fact that i E 1lI itnplies that for a11 S E s(A) with i E S ~i.nd ~S~ ~ 2 the~re is ~
k E { 1. .. ., t} ~uch tlt~~t S C T(1~) U{ i}. Thcrefc,rc, ( ~) c,)n~tls ~
( 1)~ti~nnf~
1 - Z .
SE`7(A):,ES,~S~12 Isl
SincP i E 11I, wF~ ltave { } E E(A), so ( 8) equals
SE~'( A):,E.S
~-1 ~~snnr~t~
~S~ - ~1(~, unf,A).
Lc~t i E.~~~.V . First ttote t kt~t w~~ tn~~y ~ssumF~ tltat ~{ k E{ l,..., t} ~ T( k)~(~ } ~ J 2, f~~t'
„tlt~~t'LVis~~ N,(.r) - U att~1 {S E~(.-l) ~ z E S} -(~, so trivi~tlly ( 5) is satisfi~~l.
Sittcc fc,r ~ill Ii C{ 1, ..., t} with ~Ií ~) 2
~ Pk~s~ - ~ ~ ~ ~-i~isiftxiH(StJ{;(k)})i~
kEA kElí SC(7'(k)nAf):5~0
~ ~ ~ ~-1~~S(k)~~1~~H(S(k)U{i(k)})~~ ~~~
,
~S(kl~ EP(fí ) kEFí
kEK






r}.1~~1-r ~5. k~ 1~~kE~t ~H(S(~') U{é(l~~)})~
(-11~~~ ~
AC{1,.





Since ~i ~.11, for each Ií C{ 1, . .., t} with ~Ií~) 2 a set ~S( ~-)~ kEti E I'( lí ) uniquely
determines a set T - H~ U S(k )~ E r( A), which sat,isfies Ext ~T, r1(T )~- U S( ~. )
kEh kE1i
and r E T. H~~nce, (10) equa,ls
(-I~~SnA1~fi
SEE(A1-~ES ~S~
- F~~~~~, uNt, A).
~~-t~ illustrate the actual compiitation of the Myerson value in
a
Ex~.NtPtE i. Lc~t ,~' -{ 1. ...,10} and ~lI - {1, 3, 4, 7, 10}. The graph (N, A) is





Consicler play-er 2~.ll. Following ( 2) we obtain four subgraphs corresponding to
T(1) -{1}, T(?) -{3}, T(3) -~ and T(4) - {6,7,8,10}. The corresponding
liolt-noniials (cf. (3)) are P~(r) - Pl(:r) - x, P3(-r) - 0 and P4(x) - r~ ~- ,~3 - s~.
HF~nce, acrordin~; to (~).
Hlf.i'1 - -Pi(-~~)Pz(.~') - P~(.r)P~(.r~) - f'1(s)1'iÍ-r) ~- P~(:r)Pt(.r)Pal.r)-i
-.rz -'~ri - .r~~ f 3.r' -.rs. So. ~i~~~(.V, ti11,A) - f~H?(r)~l.r - --~i os ~n
S
Now cousider player 3 E ~1I. We obtain two subgraphs corresponding to T(1) -{4}
and T( 2)- { 1, ?, 6, ï, 8, 10 }. The corresponding polynomials are P~ ( r)- x~d
P,,(x) - x"- -~ :rs ~- a~ - .~~} -:r' - .r' -}-.r`' - .r2 f .r3 - 2:r5 ~- rs. So, according to (4).
i
B3(a') - 1-Pi(.r)-R,(r) - 1-.r-:rz-s3-F2a'-ss andEia(~V.un1,.4) - f B3(T)cl.r - zá~
F~ir rh~~ ,~il:~~ ~~f r~ini~il~~r.i~n~~,ti ~~~~~ noc~~ that.
0
1
~ l -~', tL ~l , .-1) - ~~0 ( 255. -?S4, 45, 210, 0, -249, 269, -123, 0. 297).
It may scem tha.t the calctilatioii of the polynomials P,~(.r) (cf. (3)) may be quite lengthy,
especially if the sets T(k) ~l .1I hace a large number of elements. An alternative way to
obtain these polynomials is described below.
Let i E N and let ~T(k),-~(T(k)~} be one of the connected subgraphs corresponding to
player i as described in (2). Suppose each player p has a probability ~p to be 'active'.
Coiisi~lcr thc~ polynomial
1 - ~j (1 - ~ ~p)
jET(k)nM pEH({í(k),j})
and espand it. Now reduc-e the obtained polynomial to a niultilinear p~lynomial l~y
t,he~ simple re~coursc of reclucing each higher exponent to a 1. Finally, by replacing the
hrobabilities .rp by tlie probability a E[0, 1] we obtain the polynomial Pk(.r).
In this, ~ce arc effectively using t.he inultilinea,r extension (cf. Owen (1972)). As we
kno~ti., thc partial derivati~.e ~~ of this extension corresponds to the expectation that
otlier players ~~-ill collaborate with pla.yer i. Typically, for S C N`{i}, the term
ic(S) :- ~ ~z'i
jE5
(12)
~~orr~~sponds to thc~ probability tliat all meinbers of S collaborate, given that each j E S
ha; prohabilit,y .r~ of collaboration and assuming independence. Now, if S and T are
cli~joint, then
z~(SUT) - u(S).zc(T), (13)
siiice the pl~~y~~rs in S and T are inciependent. ~~Vhen S rl T~~, however, (13) is not
qnite corrc~ct. Rather,
rt( S U T}- t~(s) . it(T ),
~~-her~~ tLe~ h,ir correspon~lti to a rcduct.ion operatien: ea.ch exponc~nt lar~er than 1 iti
r~~duc~~,cl tc, 1. If, for t~x~~iuplc, S-{ 1.'?} a.iid T- {2, 3}, then z.~(S) -.r~ r~.~, z~(T) -.rl.ra
~ncl v(SUT) -.ri.rz.r.3 -.c~.r.~.r3.
ExatvlPLE z. Let (N, u ti.t, .4) be the cvmmunication situation as described in example
1. :~gaiii consider player 2. For the subgraph corresponding to T(1) -{1}, expression
(11) y1P.1dS
1-(1-.rl),
wliich re~iilts iii th~~ l~ol~.nomial Pi (.r )-.r.
In the same way ~~.e obtain P2(a) -.r for the polynomial corresponding to T(2) -{3}.
Defining the empty product. to be 1, we easily see P3(~) - 0.
Finally, for the suhgraph corresponding to T(4) -{6,7,8,10}, expression (11) yields
1 - (1 - rsx~)(1 - :rs~a~io)-
Espanding this, we obtain
.r~;.r7 f :rfi.rs:rio - .rha7.rHr~~.
Reducing this polynomial ancl then replacing all xN's by s, we obtain
.T2 -~ ~3 - .T9~
which is exactly the desired polynomial P3(~).
~~'c now concentrate on the position value. The arc game corresponding to the
nicatiou situation (N, u~~, A) can be expresseá as
ru'sr - 1 c~ ..~ Í L) 4tr.
Li .. ~f . . `. .
commu-
LE2A`{0} N
~~~here, for all L E 2~~{0}, (A,uL) is the (arc) unanimity game
IJnr~,~ et. ~il. (1990) imply that for all L E 2A~{0}
~ 411 (L) - ~
(-1)I~U.~n~~[~
' .. 0
on L. The results of
if (N(L),L) is a tree and Ext (N(L),L) - N(L) rl lll
else,
~~-hrrf~ 1~'(L) is thc~ set of I~~layers who are end points of an arc in L. Hence, for all a E A




where ~~(.~) :- {L C.-1 ~(N(L),L) is a tree, Ext(N(L),L) - N(L) (l ll~f}.
In ordcr to apply (15) we have to find all elements in A(A) containing an




Let u-{i(1), i(2)} E.4. Clearly. since (N, A) is a tree, the partition N~(.q~{a}) consists
of two distinct components C(1) and C(2) with i(1) E C(1) and i(2) E C(2). For each
~ E{1,2} we define the connected subgraph ~T(k),A~T(~-)~~ of ~C(k),A~C(k)~~ as in
(2). In deriving a generating function for ~(.4, r~' ) we suppose that each arc has a
Prcib~tibilit~. .r tr, he 'available' and w~e compute for each stibgraph ~T(k),r1~T(k)~~ the
probahility- P~;(x) that at least one of the players in .'11 ~iT(k) can actually interact with
play-er r(~). L;sing the inclusion-exclnsion principle this probability Pk(:~) is given by
Pk ~ ~T ~ -
for k r` {1, 2}. The expected cost savings an arc generates by linking up the components
C(1) and C(2) are described bv the generating function B~(a),
Ba~~~ -- pI~T~ ' P2~~ ~- ~17~
`ow- w-e can forniiilate
THEOrtEM 3. Let (N,.~) }-~e a tree with ~N~ 1 2. Then for all 1LI E 2N`{0},
~~ k-1 SCf I'(k)nA1):S~O
fc~r all a E.~1, where Ba(:r ) is defined as in (17).
Proof. Lct n E.4. ~~e iuay assume that T(1) and T(2) are both non-empty, for otherwisc
Bn(.r) - 0 and {L E A(.4) ~ a E L} -~, so, trivially (18) is satisfied. Now
i i











whcrc~ I'({1,3}) :- {(S(1),S(2)) ~ S(k) C(T(k) fl ?II),S(k) ~ 0 for I~ E {1.3}}.
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Carrying out the integration in expression (19) we obtain
2(-1)~.-~c15(~~IfI)





~~~H{S(1) ~ s(2))~ ~
?~ote that each pair { S(1), S( 2) } E I'( { 1, 2} ) uniquely determines a set
L-.-1(H(S(1)US(2))} E A( ~), which satisfies a~ E L and Ext(N(L),L) - S(1)US(2).
Hence, ( 30 ) equals
~ (-1)~N(L)~M~ .
~L~ - ~a(A.rjv"). (]
LE:1(A):aEL
~~'t` illustra,te the actual computation of the position valuc in
ExAMPr.~ s. Let (N, u;y, A) be the commlrnication siirration as described in example
1. Con~icler playe~r 6. To obtain the position value of player 6 we have to compute
~{z,t~}(A.r~' ).~{s,r}(.4,rN') and ~{s.a}(.~~r'w' )~
For a:- {2,6} we obtain (cf. (2)) the subgraphs corresponding to T(1) -{1,2,3}
and T(?) - {6.7,8, 10} with corresponding polynomials (cf. (16)) Pr(x) - 2z - a~
and PZ(r) -.r f r'- -~3. Hence, according to (17). 9Q(.r) - 2a~ f ra - 3:r~ ~.rs ancl
(I'
~a(~ r~~~c ) - J Ba(x)~~ - 6ó'
0
For b:- {6, 7} we obtain T(1) -{1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10} ancl T(2) -{7} and the Polynomials
Pr(.r) - 3.r~ - x'3 - 2x4 -}- :rs and P2(a) - 1. Hence, Be(a) - 3~~ -:r3 - 2a4 -~ xs and
I
~e(.~. r`N„ ) - f 96(.r)rl.r - só -
~,
Fillally, for c~ :- {6, 8} we obta.in T(1) -{1, 2, 3, 6, ï} and T(2) - {8, 10} with corres-
Ironcling Pr7lynornial5 PI(:r) -.r f 2.r2 - 3.r~ ~.r"} anrl PZ(.r) -.r. Hent-c`, wc have
t
B~(.r ) - ,r1 ~- 2:r~3 - 3.r'; ~- .r~ antl ~, (.9, rti"r ) - ~~ B~(.r )d.r - 5 .
0
~` t' nt)~V fOIIl~lltt`
~s( ~-,u:~r,.-1) - r,nl({6})-
fEAF
~~P(-~`rni')-0- z(só~só~su)--íó-
Ft~r the sake of completeness ~~-e note that
1
r(:V,utit,.-1) - -(~4. -101.'?4.00.0.-S4,bJ,-48,O,JG).
1?0
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Similarlt~ to the method dPSCribed for the polpnomials with respect to the I`~Iverson
~~~lue, thc~re is an altcrnative wav to compute tlie polvnomials P,t(.r.) as clescribed ir.
('1~). The dc5ircd poly.nonri~i.l is ohtained by consiclering the pol~.nomial
1- ~ (1-
iE7'(k)nAt
aE.4~ ~~( {i(k),j })~
ancl then following a reductiun procedurP similar to the one cieseribed before.
In deriving integral fornnilas for the My-erson value and the position value we restricted
our attention to communication graphs that are trees. However, since for all communi-
c-atioii situatiotis ( N, c, -a) and all coznponents T E N~r1 we have tliat
f~~(N, c, A) -~~(T, c ~~r, -4(T ))
and
~t(1~',c,A) - ~z(T.c ~T,.4(T))
for all i E T( where c ~T denotes the restrict.ion of c to T), the int.egral formulas can be
used to compute both values for comnnrnication situations with cycle-free communica-
t.ion graphs.
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